Microsoft Cloud PKI: Deploy Intune Certificates

We define the access scenario, prepare the profile design and support a bounded pilot. Deliverables include configuration records, test evidence and operating responsibilities. Scope is agreed before work starts; redesigning the entire enterprise PKI is a separate decision.

Intune enrollment and support for the relevant SCEP profile are prerequisites. We assess the actual platforms and management modes rather than assuming every device class is covered. The agreed device matrix also records exceptions and untested combinations.

Useful inputs include a device inventory, existing Intune profiles, the intended Wi-Fi or VPN scenario, and identity and network contacts. We also record existing CAs and known access problems. Missing information becomes an explicit prerequisite with an owner.

We reconcile the intended users and devices with current licensing terms and the existing agreement. Subscription costs are shown separately from implementation and operating effort. An existing Intune agreement is not treated as sufficient entitlement without assessment.

The options include a cloud hierarchy and connection to a private CA through BYOCA. We assess existing trust relationships, operating capability and the consequences of change. The decision record identifies the selected option and each team’s prerequisites.

The design connects trusted certificate and SCEP profiles to the agreed groups. Identity mapping and certificate requirements are aligned with the access scenario. We check interactions with existing profiles before assigning changes to a larger device population.

Devices must also trust the authentication service they contact. Microsoft Cloud PKI does not supply that service’s TLS server certificates. The project therefore checks both directions of trust and records which team owns each certificate chain.

No. The access service must map the authenticated identity to an appropriate permission. We also test negative cases, such as an identity that should not be admitted. Certificate issuance and access authorisation are recorded as separate results.

We select representative devices and a manageable access path together. Success criteria are agreed before configuration. The pilot should expose real dependencies without assuming a complete production migration. Exceptions and required follow-up tests remain visible.

We test the intended lifecycle on selected devices and record the implications of replacement or re-enrollment. New configurations are coordinated with existing access paths. A one-time login test does not establish how the service will operate later.

The procedure connects reporting, decision-making, certificate revocation and device or account actions. We agree the sequence with the responsible teams. Published revocation alone is not treated as evidence that every existing connection has immediately terminated.

We associate a failure with assignment, request, installation or authentication. Device evidence and access-service logs are correlated using relevant times and identities. The operating guide identifies the required evidence and the next responsible team.

We map available certificate and profile reports to specific operating questions, with review ownership and escalation routes. Reports are interpreted in their time context. A dashboard replaces neither an actual authentication test nor comprehensive security monitoring.

Microsoft Cloud PKI is managed through Intune. A separate Azure Key Vault project therefore needs its own use case and scope. The handover records the administrative interfaces actually required for the agreed operation.

Those applications are outside the Wi-Fi/VPN pilot described here. They require separate assessment of certificate type, key distribution, application support and recovery. We record them as separate work packages rather than assigning every general PKI use to this deployment.

Before replacement is considered, we record the applications still served and their owners. The pilot does not authorise shutting down an existing CA. Migration or coexistence decisions follow the established dependencies and an agreed transition plan.

It records groups, sequence, communication, checks and stop criteria. Results are assessed after each agreed stage, with owners for unresolved exceptions. Expansion is based on demonstrated pilot results rather than a generic time-saving promise.

The handover includes the approved profile design, assignments, test results and guidance for typical support cases. Responsibilities and known limitations are included. Configured features, tested procedures and outstanding actions are reported separately.

We assign responsibility for evaluating new features and limitations. Profile or trust changes are paired with targeted tests. A roadmap is a reviewable plan, not confirmation that an announced feature is supported today.